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Abstract
We introduce noisy information in the determination of stock prices. Agents receive a
noisy signal about the structural shock driving future dividend variations. The resulting
equilibrium stock price includes a transitory component – the “noise bubble” – which
can be responsible for boom and bust episodes unrelated to economic fundamentals. We
propose a non-standard VAR procedure to estimate the structural shock and the “noise”
shock, their impulse response functions and the bubble component of stock prices. We
apply such procedure to US data and find that noise explains a large fraction of stock
price volatility. In particular the dot-com bubble is entirely explained by noise. On the
contrary the stock price boom peaking in 2007 is not a bubble, whereas the following
stock market crisis is largely due to negative noise shocks.
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1 Introduction
Stock markets react to news about events whose actual consequences on economic fun-
damentals are often highly uncertain. An international crisis may be resolved peacefully
or escalate into war; inventions may take a lot of time, or even fail, to produce impor-
tant technological improvements; a sovereign debt crisis may be solved by sound policy
measures or end up with a ruinous default. On the one hand, there are news which
anticipate major changes of future dividends; on the other hand, there are news whose
potential effects never materialize. Typically, when a piece of news arrives, investors do
not know which of the two types the news belongs to, but they have to take a decision
immediately. Since such decisions affect prices, part of stock prices fluctuations can be
driven by news unrelated to economic fundamentals.
In this paper we introduce noisy information in the determination of stock prices.
Dividends are driven by a structural economic shock, let us say the “dividend” shock.
The effects of such shock are delayed, so that traders cannot see it by looking at current
dividends. Agents have some information about the current shock, in that they see
a signal, given by the sum of the dividend shock and a “noise” shock, not affecting
fundamentals.1 On impact, investors react to both the dividend shock and the noise
shock in just the same way, being unable to distinguish between them. As time goes
on, however, agents learn about the true nature of past dividend shocks by looking at
realized dividends, and adjust their initial response. Thus a noise shock announcing
good news leads to a kind of “rational exuberance”: dividends are expected to rise and
stock prices go up. But in the end agents realize that the shock was in fact noise and
the bubble bursts.
Hence the noise shock can generate transitory boom and bust episodes, the “noise
bubbles”, unrelated to the intrinsic value of equities. The key difference with the stan-
dard theory of rational bubbles is that here bubbles are a component of what is usually
referred to as the “fundamental” value of securities, i.e. the present value of expected
dividends. Hence, unlike standard bubbles,2 noise bubbles have nothing to do with mul-
tiple equilibria and self-fulfilling expectations and are not ruled out by the transversality
condition (see, e.g. Santos and Woodford, 1997). Our theory is different from that pre-
sented in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini, 2007, where agents are assumed to have limited
information about model’s parameters and form their expectations through a learning
mechanism. Here on the contrary agents know the model and information is limited only
in that the shocks are not observable.
1We follow here suggestions coming from the recent news-noise business cycle literature (Beaudry and
Portier, 2004, 2006, Christiano et al., 2008, Lorenzoni, 2009, Angeletos and La’ O, 2010, Forni, Gambetti
and Sala, 2013).
2See e.g. Samuelson (1985), Tirole (1985), and more recently Martin and Ventura, (2012).
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The above result is quite general, in that it does not require special assumptions
about the economic model generating dividends and stock prices. In fact, we simply
assume that (i) prices depend on agents’ expectations about future dividends and (ii)
the difference between the log of prices and the log of dividends is stationary.3 Both (i)
and (ii) are common features of existing models. The reason why (i) and (ii) are sufficient
to obtain the noise bubble is simple. Noise shocks are news which are perceived by agents
as potentially anticipating future changes in dividends. Hence they affect prices in the
short run by assumption (i). But in fact dividends will not change, by the very definition
of noise shocks. Since prices follow dividends in the long run because of assumption (ii),
the effect of noise must be transitory.
The ideas presented here are not necessarily in contrast with other explanations of
bubbles. In particular, Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003, show that, once a bubble has
started, it can survive despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs, who are aware that
the market will eventually collapse, but are willing to ride the bubble until it can generate
profits. This theory of bubble persistence does not explain why a bubble arises in the first
place. The authors ascribe the responsibility to irrational traders. While not denying
the role of irrational behavior, which is well documented in the literature,4 we show here
that rational bubbles may arise from imperfect information about the structural shocks
affecting fundamentals.
Noisy information has dramatic implications for empirical analysis: if agents do
not see the structural shocks, standard structural VAR methods fail. This is because
economic data reflect agents’ behavior, which in turn depends on their information.
If agents observe current shocks, the econometrician can in principle infer them from
existing data; but if agents do not distinguish the shocks, present and past values of
observable variables cannot embed the relevant information (Blanchard, Lorenzoni and
L’Huillier, 2013).
Despite this, in our theoretical setting structural VAR methods can still be used suc-
cessfully, provided that identification is generalized to include dynamic transformations
of the VAR residuals. The reason is that, as times goes by, realized dividends reveal
whether past signals were true dividend shocks or noise. Hence, current dividend and
noise shocks, while not being combinations of current VAR residuals, are combinations
of future values of such residuals.5 A general treatment of dynamic structural VAR iden-
tification is found in Lippi and Reichlin, 1994. An application to fiscal policy is shown
3In a previous version of the present paper we assumed a simple present value model with fixed
discount factor.
4See e.g. Shiller, 2000.
5This feature is not shared by the business cycle models of Blanchard, Lorenzoni and L’Huillier, 2013
and Barsky and Sims, 2012, where agents never learn completely the true nature of past structural
shocks.
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in Mertens and Ravn, 2010. Here we propose a specific identification scheme to recover
the structural shocks along with the related impulse response functions within a noisy
information framework.6
In the empirical section we apply our structural VAR identification technique to
US stock market and dividend data. We find that noise shocks, while not affecting
fundamentals, explain a large fraction of stock price volatility at short and medium-run
horizons. On the other hand, the dividend shock has a limited impact in the short run,
but have permanent effects and explain a good deal of stock market fluctuations in the
long run. The component of log stock prices driven by noise measures the percentage
deviation of prices form the intrinsic value of stocks. Hence the historical decomposition
estimated with the VAR enables us to identify the duration and the size of past relevant
bubble episodes. The largest noise bubble of the last half century was the dot-com
episode starting in 1997:Q3 and ending in 2002:Q1; the peak was reached in the second
quarter of 2000, when prices deviated from the intrinsic value by 56%. The boom peaking
in 2007 was not a bubble, whereas the stock market crisis of 2008 was partially due to
negative noise shocks.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 discusses the econometric implications and presents our dynamic, structural
VAR identification scheme. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Economics
The idea that stock prices are affected by news about economic and political happenings
is largely accepted. Figure 1 depicts the growth rate of the S&P 500 index as well as
vertical lines in coincidence with news about major economic and political events. In
many of these episodes, the index displays large drops and peaks. For instance the index
dropped by about 20% in coincidence of the Franklin National Bank collapse and the
Worldcom bankruptcy and increased by around 10% the quarter before the official end
of the Vietnam war.
From a rational expectations perspective, the interpretation of the above findings
is that stock prices change because agents expect future dividends to change in conse-
quence of the event agents have become aware of. Figure 2 plots the quarterly series of
log-dividends and log-prices after four major episodes: the Watergate scandal and the
Franklin National Bank collapse, the end of the Vietnam War, the Worldcom bankruptcy,
and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The series are normalized to zero in period 0
which is the period before the event occurs. The vertical line coincides with the event.
6See also the companion paper Forni, Gambetti, Lippi and Sala, 2013, where a similar news-noise
setting is applied to business cycle issues.
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The drop in stock prices following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy clearly anticipates a
decline of future dividends. This happens, but to a much lesser extent and with a longer
delay, also in other two episodes, namely the Vietnam War (with a reversed sign) and the
Watergate scandal. The fall in prices associated to the Worldcom bankruptcy, however,
is associated with a mild increase in future dividends. This last fact can be reconciled
with the rational expectation paradigm provided that one admits the possibility that,
at the time the news arrives, agents are unable to predict its effects on future dividends.
The rationale of this could be that agents are simply uncertain about the nature of the
shock behind the news. In other words, agents could be uncertain about whether the
shock leading Worldcom to bankruptcy is a bad financial shock with disastrous conse-
quences on the financial system or simply a temporary and isolated episode with no
further consequences on the economy. Below we develop formally a model based on this
idea.
2.1 The “noise bubble” in a simple present value model
In this subsection we use a stripped-down model to clarify the intuition underlying
our idea. Let us assume that stock prices follow the present value model proposed by
Campbell and Shiller, 1988, where the log of stock prices is determined by the expected
discounted sum of future log dividends. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
“discount factors” are constant. Formally, the log of prices pt is given by
pt =
k
1− ρ +
1− ρ
ρ
∞∑
j=1
ρjEtdt+j , (1)
where dt are dividends, expressed in logs, Et denotes expected value, conditional to
information available at time t, ρ = 1/(1 + eµ), where µ = E(dt− pt), and k = − log(1 +
r)− log ρ+ (1− ρ) log(1/ρ− 1), r being the constant rate of return on equities. Observe
that, in the above equation, speculative bubbles, as defined in standard textbook models,
are ruled out and stock prices are simply given by what is usually referred to as the
“fundamental” value.7
Le us assume here that dividends are driven by a structural shock whose effects are
delayed. We assume that dt follows the equation
dt = dt−1 + at−1. (2)
where at is the structural dividend shock, a Gaussian white noise with variance σ
2
a. Notice
that at does not affect dt on impact. This is a feature typical of the so called “news”
shocks, i.e. shocks which may change agents’ expectation before affecting economic
7Equation (1) is derived in the Appendix.
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fundamentals. The basic novelty of our model is that agents have incomplete information,
so that our news are noisy. Precisely, agents do not see the current dividend shock, but
observe only the signal
st = at + et, (3)
where et (the “noise”) is a Gaussian white noise, orthogonal to at at all leads and lags.
The signal sometimes conveys relevant information about the future (when et is small),
sometimes is essentially misleading (when et is large).
Finally, we assume that economic agents observe dt at time t, so that agents’ infor-
mation set at time t, say Ωt, is given by the linear space spanned by present and past
values of dividends and the signal st. Below we shall compare results for Ωt with what
obtained with complete information, i.e. the information set Φt, spanned by present and
past values of at and et.
From equations (1) to (3),
Etdt+1 = Etdt + Etat = dt + Etat.
Moreover, Etdt+2 = Etdt+1 + Etat+1. Since at+1 is unpredictable, we have Etdt+2 =
Etdt+1. Proceeding recursively we obtain
Etdt+j = Etdt+1 = dt + Etat for j ≥ 1.
Applying equation (1), we get
pt =
k
1− ρ + dt + Etat. (4)
Now let us consider the expectation of at. For the sake of comparison, we begin
by deriving the stock price equation under the assumption that at is observable, i.e.
the information set is Φt. Denoting by E
Φ
t the expectation conditional to Φt, we have
EΦt at = at. Using (2) and (4), we obtain
∆pΦt = at. (5)
When a positive shock arrives, the market reacts immediately by rising prices by the
amount at and the noise shock has no effect on prices.
Coming to the present setting, at is not observed. The information set of the agents
is given by Ωt. By equation (2), dt reveals the past of at, but is completely uninformative
about the present. Similarly, past values of st do not tell anything about at. Hence, E
Ω
t at
is simply the projection of at on st, i.e. (σ
2
a/σ
2
s)st = (σ
2
a/σ
2
s)at + (σ
2
a/σ
2
s)et. Replacing
in (4), taking the first difference and rearranging terms gives
∆pt =
σ2a
σ2s
(
at +
σ2e
σ2a
at−1
)
+
σ2a
σ2s
(et − et−1) . (6)
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To interpret the above equation, let us assume that, at time t, the signal is perfectly
correct, i.e. the noise is zero and st = at. Agents do not see this, so that they are
too much cautious and under-react on impact, the coefficient being σ2a/σ
2
s , which is less
than the perfect information response of one. After one period, however, by observing
dt, agents realize that the signal was indeed correct and adjust their behavior to get a
cumulated response equal to σ2a/σ
2
s + σ
2
e/σ
2
s = 1.
At the opposite extreme, when the signal is completely false, i.e. the structural
economic shock is zero in t and st = et, agents are too much optimistic, if et is positive,
or pessimistic, if et is negative, and over-react on impact, with coefficient σ
2
a/σ
2
s , which
of course is greater that the “correct” response zero. Notice that the impact response to
et is the same of at, since people cannot distinguish false news from true news on impact.
Again, after one period, this kind of “rational exuberance” disappears and prices go back
to the previous level.
According to (6) and (2), the noise shock affects stock prices, though dividends are
noise free. Price changes are driven by two components, let us say the “structural
component” or the “intrinsic value”, driven by the present and past values of at, and
the “noise component”, driven by the present and past values of et. The latter is similar
to a bubble, in that it is not related to fundamentals. Noticeably, the effect of false
news is transitory, the cumulated response being zero (whereas the effect of true news
is permanent, the cumulated response being one). Hence, the noise bubble is fated to
burst, like traditional bubbles.
There are important differences between traditional bubbles and our noise bubble.
In the present value model, traditional bubbles are related to multiple equilibria; they
arise because the economy is shifting to an unstable equilibrium, for reasons which are
not specified by the theory. Sooner or later they burst, but the theory has nothing to
say about when this will happen. By contrast, the noise bubble (i) is part of the stable
equilibrium; (ii) arise when the market exaggerate the implications of current signals
about future economic fundamentals; (iii) lasts until agents learn that the signal was in
fact noise.
Two interesting limit cases are σ2e = 0, i.e. there is no noise at any t, and σ
2
e → ∞,
i.e. false news are largely predominant. When σ2e = 0, the signal st is equal to at, so
that agents can see the true economic shock. Obviously in this case the noise bubble is
not there and equation (6) reduces to (5).
Somewhat surprisingly, the noise bubble disappears even in the opposite case, when
σ2e goes to infinity. For, the variance of the noise component is 2σ
4
aσ
2
e/σ
4
s , which vanishes
for σ2e → ∞. The economic intuition is that, when et is very large, the signal is not
reliable, so that the stock market does not react to it. Equation (6) reduces to pt =
pt−1 + at−1, reflecting the fact that, st being not informative, agents see only at−1 and
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therefore respond to the structural shock with delay.
The noise bubble is large when dividend and noise shocks have approximately the
same size. To see this, let us compute the ratio of the variance of the noise component
to the variance of ∆pt. The structural component in equation (6) has variance σ
2
a(σ
4
a +
σ4e)/σ
4
s , whereas the variance of the noise component is 2σ
4
aσ
2
e/σ
4
s . Summing the two
variances gives the variance of ∆pt, i. e. σ
2
a. The ratio of the variance of the noise
component to the total variance is then 2σ2eσ
2
a/σ
4
s . Such ratio is zero for both σ
2
e = 0
and σ2e →∞, as observed above, and reaches its maximum 1/2 for σ2e = σ2a.
2.2 The general two-shock model: dividends and information sets
Let us now generalize the simple model of the previous subsection. For the dividend
process we assume
∆dt = c(L)at, (7)
where c(L) is a rational function in L and the dividend shock at is a white noise process.
At time t, agents get some (noisy) information about at, since they see the signal st,
which is still given by equation (3). We retain the assumption that the shock at is a news
shock which does not affect dt on impact, i.e. c(0) = 0. Economic agents can observe
∆dt at time t. Hence agents’ information set is Ωt = span(∆dt−k, st−k, k ≥ 0).
Since a basic feature of our model is that the information set of the agents, Ωt, does
not coincide with the information set spanned by the structural shocks, Φt, we start by
studying the relation between these information sets. The difference between Ωt and Φt
is characterized by the relation linking the variables (∆dt st)
′, which agents can observe,
on the one hand, and the shocks (at et)
′, which agents cannot observe, on the other
hand. From equations (7) and (3), we have(
∆dt
st
)
=
(
c(L) 0
1 1
)(
at
et
)
. (8)
This relation is not invertible, since the determinant of the MA matrix is c(L), which by
assumption vanishes for L = 0, which is less than 1 in modulus. Non-invertibility implies
that we do not have a VAR representation for ∆dt and st in the structural shocks, and
that present and past values of the observed variables ∆dt and st contain strictly less
information than present and past values of at and et.
8
8Notice that, if the representation were invertible, such a VAR would exist, so that the structural
shocks could be written as a linear combination of present and past values of observable variables, and
the information sets Φt and Ωt would be equal, contrary to the assumption that the dividend shock does
not belong to the information set of the agents.
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Representation (8) is not the only MA representation of ∆dt and st. In particular,
there is a “fundamental” representation, i.e. an MA representation in the innovations of
Ωt.
9 Let rj , j = 1, . . . , n, be the roots of c(L) which are smaller than one in modulus
and
b(L) =
n∏
j=1
L− rj
1− r¯jL, (9)
where r¯j is the complex conjugate of rj . Consider the innovation representation:(
∆dt
st
)
=
(
c(L)
b(L)
c(L)σ2a
σ2s
0 1
)(
ut
st
)
, (10)
where (
ut
st
)
=
(
b(L)σ
2
e
σ2s
−b(L)σ2a
σ2s
1 1
)(
at
et
)
. (11)
It is easily verified that (10) and (11) imply (8). Moreover, ut and st are jointly white
noise and orthogonal.10 Finally, the determinant of the matrix in (10), i.e. c(L)/b(L),
vanishes only for |L| ≥ 1 because of the definition of b(L). It follows that ut and st are
orthogonal innovations for Ωt, i.e. Ωt = span(ut−k, st−k, k ≥ 0).
The shock ut, let us call it the surprise shock, is the deviation of realized dividends
from agents’ expectation, i.e. agents’ new information resulting from the observation
of ∆dt. The contemporaneous value of ∆dt conveys information concerning the past
of dividend and noise shocks (there is no information about the present, since, by the
definition of b(L), the condition c(0) = 0 implies that b(0) = 0).
In the long run, the observation of economic fundamentals completely unveils whether
past signals were true or not: as time passes, agents learn whether the shock was a
dividend shock or a noise shock. To make this point clear, consider that the roots of
the determinant of the matrix in (11), b(L), are smaller than one in modulus by the
definition. Hence representation (11), though not invertible toward the past, can be
inverted toward the future:11(
at
et
)
=
(
1/b(L) σ
2
a
σ2s
−1/b(L) σ2e
σ2s
)(
ut
st
)
. (12)
9“Fundamental” in the present context is a term of time series theory, which has nothing to do with
the “fundamental” value of a security or economic “fundamentals”.
10Let us first observe that ut = b(L)(σ
2
eat − σ2aet) is a white noise process. To see this, consider that
σ2eat−σ2aet is a white noise (being the sum of two white noise processes, orthogonal at all leads and lags)
and b(L) is a so called “Blaschke” factor, such that b(L)b(L−1) = 1. Hence the covariance generating
function is σ2ub(L)b(L
−1) = σ2u, so that all lagged covariances are zero. Obviously, st = at + et is a white
noise as well. In addition, ut is orthogonal to st at all leads and lags, since σ
2
eat − σ2aet is orthogonal to
at + et.
11Note that 1/b(L) = b(F ), where F = L−1 is the forward operator.
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The above equation shows that the structural shock and the noise shock are linear
combinations of future and present values of the surprise shock ut and of the signal
shock st. This point is crucial for the identification of the econometric model, as we shall
see in Section 3.
2.3 The general two-shock model: stock prices
Coming to stock prices, we do not need — and do not want — to take a precise stance
on the economic model generating them. We simply assume (i) that expectation about
future dividends play a role in the determination of prices, so that investors react to new
information, i.e. to news and surprise shocks, i.e.
∆pt = m(L)ut + d(L)st, (13)
where m(L) and d(L) are rational functions. For identification purposes, we need that
prices react on impact to the signal, i.e. d(0) 6= 0. In addition, we assume (ii) that
the difference between log prices and log dividends, pt − dt, is stationary, as implied by
standard models.12
Stationarity of pt− dt entails restrictions on m(L) and d(L): namely, each one of the
shocks must have the same long-run effect on both pt and dt. In particular, from (13)
and the first line of (10), we get
m(1) = c(1)/b(1) (14)
d(1) = c(1)σ2a/σ
2
s . (15)
Now let us derive the structural representation for prices. Using (13) and (11) we
obtain:
∆pt =
(
m(L) d(L)
)(ut
st
)
=
(
m(L) d(L)
)(b(L)σ2e/σ2s −b(L)σ2a/σ2s
1 1
)(
at
et
)
= [m(L)b(L)σ2e/σ
2
s + d(L)]at + [d(L)−m(L)b(L)σ2a/σ2e ]et
= α(L)at + β(L)et. (16)
Using restrictions (14) and (15) it is seen that β(1) = 0, so that β(L) can be factorized
as (1− L)β˜(L) and we can write
∆pt = α(L)at + (1− L)β˜(L)et. (17)
Equation (17) generalizes equation (6). Prices depend on et, even if dividends do not.
The effect of noise is transitory, like in (6), but now the bubble (the second term on the
12Cochrane, 2008, shows that dt and pt are indeed cointegrated.
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right-hand side) may last more than one period, depending on both the responses d(L)
and m(L), as well as the “learning” factor b(L). The intuition for this result is simple.
Noise shocks are news which are perceived by agents as potentially anticipating future
changes in dividends. Hence they affect prices in the short run by assumption (i). But
in fact dividends will not change, by the very definition of noise shocks. Since prices
follow dividends in the long run because of assumption (ii), the effect of noise must be
transitory.
2.4 Additional shocks
The above model can be easily generalized to include additional shocks, say vt, provided
that such shocks are observed by economic agents. The equations for dividends becomes
∆dt = c(L)at + h(L)vt, (18)
where h(L) is a row vector of rational functions in the lag operator L and vt is an
orthonormal white noise vector of structural shocks, orthogonal to at at all leads and
lags. If agents can observe both ∆dt and vt, they can observe ∆d
∗
t = c(L)at either.
The relation between agents’ information set and the information set spanned by the
structural shocks is still characterized by the equations in Subsection 2.2, with ∆d∗t in
place of ∆dt.
Prices will potentially react to shocks in vt, according to
∆pt = m(L)ut + d(L)st + n(L)vt, (19)
where the entries of n(L) are again rational functions. For instance, equation (19) can
be thought of as stemming from the present value model of Campbell and Shiller, 1988,
with variable discount factors. Assuming stationarity of pt − dt, the structural equation
for prices is now
∆pt = α(L)at + (1− L)β˜(L)et + n(L)vt, (20)
where α(L)and β˜(L) are as before.
3 Econometrics
In the present section we analyze the basic econometric problem related to the estimation
of the structural shocks at and et and their impulse response functions. To begin, we
focus on the bivariate representation of ∆dt and ∆pt, assuming h(L) = n(L) = 0. A
multivariate model including the additional shocks in the vector vt will be considered in
Section 3.4.
11
From (10) and (16), it is seen that the structural representation of ∆dt and ∆pt can
be written as (
∆dt
∆pt
)
=
(
c(L)σa 0
α(L)σa β(L)σe
)(
at/σa
et/σe
)
, (21)
where β(1) = 0 and the shocks are normalized to have unit variance, as usual in structural
VAR analysis. Just like in representation (8), however, the determinant of the MA matrix
vanishes for L = 0, since c(0) = 0. It follows that the representation is non-fundamental.
This has dramatic consequences for empirical analysis.
3.1 Non-invertibility in models with noisy shocks
The problem of non-invertibility, or “non-fundamentalness” is a debated issue in the
structural VAR literature. Early references are Hansen and Sargent, 1991 and Lippi and
Reichlin, 1993, 1994; more recent contributions include Giannone and Reichlin, 2006,
Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2007, Chari et al., 2008, Mertens and Ravn, 2010, Forni
and Gambetti, 2014, Forni, Gambetti and Sala, 2014. In essence, the problem is that
standard SVAR methods assume that the structural shocks are linear combinations of
the residuals obtained by estimating a VAR. If the structural MA representation of the
variables included in the VAR is non-fundamental, the structural shocks are not linear
combinations of such residuals, so that the method fails.13
In most of the economic literature, the structural shocks are elements of agents’
information set and non-fundamentalness may arise if the econometrician uses less in-
formation than the agents. In this case, non-fundamentalness can in principle be solved
by enlarging the information set used by the econometrician (Forni, Giannone, Lippi
and Reichlin, 2009, Forni and Gambetti, 2011, Forni, Gambetti and Sala, 2013). In the
present setting non-fundamentalness stems from agents’ ignorance and cannot be solved
by adding variables to the VAR.14 The economic intuition is that agents’ behavior cannot
reveal information that agents do not have. Stock prices or other variables which are the
outcome of agents’ decisions do not add anything to the information already contained
in dt and st. More generally, in models in which agents cannot see the structural shocks,
the structural representation is non fundamental for whatever set of observable variables.
13An MA representation is fundamental if and only if its associated matrix is non-singular for all L with
modulus less than one (see Rozanov, 1967, Ch. 2). This condition is slightly different from invertibility,
since invertibility requires non-singularity also when L is unit modulus. Hence non-fundamentalness im-
plies non-invertibility, whereas the converse is not true. When the variables are cointegrated, for instance,
the MA representation of the first differences is not invertible, but nonetheless can be fundamental. In
such a case, non-invertibility can be easily circumvented by resorting to structural ECM or level VAR
estimation. Non-fundamentalness is a kind of non-invertibility which cannot be solved in this way.
14See also Blanchard et al., 2013.
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For, if it were, agents could infer the shocks from the variables themselves, contrary to
the assumption (unless we assume that there are variables that are observable for the
econometrician but not for the agents).
In our theoretical framework, if identification is generalized to include dynamic uni-
tary transformations (i.e. Blaschke matrices), structural VAR estimation may still be
successful. Dynamic unitary transformations are rotations which may involve, besides
current values, past and future values of the VAR residuals. In fact, we have already
seen in Section 2.2, equation (12), that the dividend and noise shocks can be written as
linear combinations of the current signal shock and future values of the surprise shock,
which in principle can be found with a standard VAR procedure.
A general treatment of dynamic identification in structural VARs can be found in
Lippi and Reichlin, 1994. When considering the more general class of dynamic rotations,
identification is more demanding than in the standard, contemporaneous rotation setting,
because it requires stronger theoretical restrictions.15 A contribution of the present paper
(and the companion paper Forni, Gambetti, Lippi and Sala, 2013) is to show that in
models with noisy signals the restrictions arising naturally from the theory are sufficient
to identify the structural shocks. Below we explain in detail how to find the structural
and the noise shock, as well as the corresponding impulse response functions.16
3.2 Dynamic identification of the bivariate VAR
In this subsection we present our identification and estimation strategy for the bivariate
case. Our objective is to get an estimate of the structural representation (21).
From (10) and (13) we get the innovation representation for the normalized shocks(
∆dt
∆pt
)
=
(
a11(L) a12(L)
a21(L) a22(L)
)(
ut/σu
st/σs
)
, (22)
where17 (
a11(L) a12(L)
a21(L) a22(L)
)
=
(
c(L)σu
b(L)
σ2ac(L)
σs
m(L)σu d(L)σs
)
. (23)
15See Mertens and Ravn, 2010.
16Blanchard et al., 2013, and Barsky and Sims, 2012, present news-noise models where agents never
learn the true nature of past shocks. The basic difference with respect to our model in this respect is that
in both papers there are three structural shocks, whereas agents see just two dynamically independent
sources of information. Since the dynamic dimension of the structural shocks is larger than the dynamic
dimension of agents’ information space, there is no way for the agents to see such shocks, even when
assuming known the future values of the observable series. For the same reason, the econometrician
cannot recover the shocks and the impulse response functions by means of a structural VAR, even by
resorting to dynamic transformations of the VAR residuals.
17Let us remind that σu =
σeσa
σs
.
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Moreover, from (11) we get the mapping between the normalized innovations and the
normalized structural shocks:(
ut/σu
st/σs
)
=
(
b(L)σeσs −b(L)σaσs
σa
σs
σe
σs
)(
at/σa
et/σe
)
. (24)
Our basic idea is to estimate (21) by estimating representation (22) along with rela-
tion (24). Let us discuss these two steps in turn.
About representation (22), unfortunately, there is no convincing motivation to assume
fundamentalness. However, in this case, whether (22) is fundamental or not can be
checked by a simple test, see Section 3.3. We proceed in two steps. Firstly, we assume
that representation (22) is fundamental, so that it can be estimated by means of standard
structural VAR procedures. Secondly, in Section 3.3, we discuss the testing procedure,
which is then employed in Section 4.
Assuming that (22) is fundamental, an estimate of [aij(L)]i=1,2;j=1,2 is obtained by
estimating and inverting an unrestricted VAR. Identification is obtained by imposing
aˆ12(0) = 0, which corresponds to the condition c(0) = 0, which is derived by the theory.
The theory imposes further restrictions on the entries of the MA matrix appearing in
(22). We do not use such restrictions for estimation, since we want to use them for
testing purposes (see below).
Let us come now to estimation of (24). First, we need an estimate of b(L), which is
given by the roots of c(L) that are smaller than 1 in modulus (see equation (9)). Such
roots are revealed by our estimate of aˆ12(L), which is proportional to c(L) (of course, one
out of these roots will be zero because of the identification constraint aˆ12(0) = 0). This
is the crucial step of our procedure. The proportionality of the reaction of dividends to
the dividend shock, on the one hand, and the signal shock, on the other hand, is due
to the assumption that noise shocks do not affect dividends at any lag —an assumption
which is essential, from a theoretical point of view, to distinguish the dividend shock
from the noise shock.
Next, we need an estimate of σa/σs and σe/σs. Since b(1) = 1, an estimate of σa/σe
can be obtained as
σ̂a/σe =
aˆ12(1)
aˆ11(1)
.
Considering that σ2a/σ
2
s +σ
2
e/σ
2
s = 1, it is seen that σa/σs and σe/σs are the sine and the
cosine, respectively, of the angle whose tangent is σa/σe. Hence σ̂a/σs and σ̂e/σs can be
obtained as sin(arctan(σ̂a/σe)) and cos(arctan(σ̂a/σe)), respectively.
Finally, the (normalized) structural shocks at/σa and et/σe can be estimated by
inverting equation (24):(
at/σa
et/σe
)
=
1
σs
(
b(F )σe σa
−b(F )σa σe
)(
ut/σu
st/σs
)
. (25)
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The above relation involves future values of ut and st, so that the structural shocks
cannot be estimated consistently at the end of the sample. This is perfectly in line
with the assumption that neither the agents, nor the econometrician can see the current
values of the structural shocks. However, in the middle of the sample future is known
and relation (25) can in principle provide reliable estimates of at/σa and et/σe.
Summing up, our estimation strategy is the following.
1. Estimate an (unrestricted) reduced form VAR for dt and pt
18 and identify by
imposing aˆ12(0) = 0, i.e. that st does not affect dt on impact. In such a way we
get an estimate of the matrix [aij(L)]i=1,2;j=1,2 appearing in (22) as well as the
normalized surprise and signal shocks.
2. Estimate b(L) by computing the roots of aˆ12(L), selecting those which are smaller
than one in modulus and using (9).
3. Estimate σa/σe as the ratio aˆ12(1)/aˆ11(1).
19 Then we get σ̂a/σs and σ̂e/σs as
sin(arctan(σ̂a/σe)) and cos(arctan(σ̂a/σe)), respectively. Steps 2 and 3 provide an
estimate of (24).
4. Finally, estimate the structural impulse response functions in (21) by using (22)
and (24). Moreover, the structural shocks are estimated by using relation (25).
3.3 Testing and additional estimation issues
As already noticed, the restrictions appearing in representation (22) which are not used
for identification can be used for testing. In particular, we can test the theoretical
implication that et has temporary effects on prices. Moreover, aˆ11(L)bˆ(L)σ̂a/σs should
be equal to aˆ12(L)σ̂e/σs.
20 Such condition implies that in the structural representation
(21) the upper-right response function is zero, which can be tested by verifying whether
the confidence bands include the x-axis for all lags.
Let us now go back to the first step of our estimation procedure, i.e. estimation of
(22).
As assumed above, dt and pt are cointegrated. Hence we estimate a VAR in the levels
of the variables, see Section 4, rather than the first differences.
Moreover, as observed in Section 3.2, representation (22) might be non-fundamental.
In this context, non-fundamentalness, when it is there, does not arise from the fact
that agents do not have enough information, but from the fact that the econometri-
cian uses less information than the agents, i.e. span(∆dt−k,∆pt−k, k ≥ 0) ⊂ Ωt =
18We estimate the VAR in levels for reasons which will be clarified below.
19In practice we compute the cumulated long-run effects as the effects at forty quarters.
20Our identification conditions imply that such relation is satisfied both on impact and in the long
run. At intermediate lags the relation can be violated.
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span(ut−k, st−k, k ≥ 0), because present and past values of dt and pt do not reveal com-
pletely ut and st.
A simple check for fundamentalness, which can be used in this case, has been pro-
posed by Forni and Gambetti, 2014. The test consists in verifying whether the estimated
shocks are orthogonal to past values of the principal components of a large data set of
macroeconomic series. In the empirical application below we replace the principal com-
ponents with a set of selected control variables. If orthogonality is rejected, the shocks
cannot be innovations with respect to available information, and the VAR should be
amended by adding variables reflecting agents’ information. A multivariate specification
may help solving the problem, by closing the gap between the information used by agents
and the one used by the econometrician.
3.4 Higher-dimensional specifications
The multivariate generalization of the bivariate model above is straightforward. Let the
vector vt have dimension (n−2) and let ∆yt be an (n−2)-dimensional vector of additional
variables driven by vt and, possibly, by st and ut. The innovation representation for the
vector (∆yt ∆dt ∆pt)
′ is∆yt∆dt
∆pt
 =
N(L) f(L) g(L)h(L) a11(L) a12(L)
n(L) a21(L) a22(L)

 vtut/σu
st/σs
 , (26)
where aij(L), i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, is as in (23) and f(L), g(L) and the entries of the
(n− 2)× (n− 2) matrix N(L) are rational functions in L.
Within the multivariate framework, the condition that the dividend shock does not
affect dt on impact is no longer sufficient, by itself, to identify the model. In the empirical
analysis we impose a Cholesky triangularization with yt ordered first, dt ordered second,
and pt ordered third, i.e. f(0) = g(0) = a12(0) = 0 and N(0) lower triangular. The
reason for this ordering is that we want to allow for a contemporary effect of vt on
dividends and stock prices; in particular, we want to allow for contemporary effects of
interest rates on prices.
The corresponding structural representation is obtained by postmultiplying the above
matrix by the multivariate extension of the matrix that maps innovations in structural
shocks in equation (24), i.e.In−2 0 00′ b(L)σe/σs −b(L)σa/σs
0′ σa/σs σe/σs
 , (27)
where 0 denotes the (n− 2)-dimensional null column vector.
16
4 Empirics
In this section we present our empirical analysis. Our benchmark specification is a four-
variable VAR with dividends, stock prices, and two interest rates. We find that, in line
with the theory, noise shocks do not affect dividends and have transitory effects on stock
prices. Despite this, noise explains a large fraction of stock market fluctuations at short
and medium run horizons and is responsible for large deviations of stock prices from the
intrinsic value of equities. Noise explain most of the information technology bubble, as
well as other boom-bust episodes, including a sizable fraction of the stock market crash
of 2008-2009.
4.1 The data
We use US quarterly series covering the period 1960:Q1— 2010:Q4. The stock price series
is the monthly average of the Standard & Poor’s Index of 500 Common Stocks reported
by Datastream (code US500STK). We converted the series in quarterly figures by taking
simple averages and dividing the resulting series by the GDP implicit price deflator
in order to express it in real terms. Dividends are NIPA Net Corporate Dividends,
divided by the GDP implicit price deflator and population aged 16 years or more (the
BLS Civilian Non-institutional Population, converted to quarterly frequency by taking
monthly averages). Both dividends and stock prices are taken in log-levels rather than
differences to avoid estimation problems related to cointegration. The interest rates
included in our baseline specification are the 3-Month Treasury Bill, Secondary Market
Rate, and the Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield. We take the monthly
averages of business days (original source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System) and converted the monthly series in quarterly figures by taking simple averages.
Interest rates are taken in levels.
To test for fundamentalness, we use an additional interest rate, the 10-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate, the inflation rate and two leading indexes. The interest rate
is treated as the interest rates described above. The inflation rate is the NIPA GDP
Implicit Price Deflator, taken in first differences of the logs. The leading indexes are the
Conference Board Leading Economic Indicators Index (Datastram code USCYLEAD)
and the Michigan University Survey of Consumers Expected Index.
Stock prices and the Conference Board leading index are taken from Datastream, the
consumer confidence index is taken from the website of the Michigan University, whereas
all other series are downloaded from the FRED data base.
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4.2 The effects of dividend and noise shocks
As a first exercise, we estimate the two-variable VAR with dividends and stock prices. We
include 4 lags, according to the AIC criterion and identify the signal, surprise, dividend
and noise shocks as explained in Section 3.2. Then we test for fundamentalness as
explained in Section 3.3, by regressing the estimated shocks onto 2 and 4 lags of the
3-Months Treasury Bill, the Aaa Corporate Bond Yield, and the four control variables
described above, one at a time. Dividend and noise shocks are truncated at time T − 4
since the filter obtained by inverting (24) involves the leads of the signal and the surprise
shocks, producing an end-of-sample bias.21 The p-values of the F -statistic of these
regressions are reported in Table 1. The null hypothesis that the signal is orthogonal to
the past of the regressors is rejected at the 5% level for all interest rates and the inflation
rate. A similar result holds for the noise shock. We conclude that dividends and stock
prices do not contain enough information to represent adequately agents’ information
set.
Hence we amend the VAR by adding two control variables, i.e the 3-Month Treasury
Bill, Secondary Market Rate and the Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield. We
estimate the four-variable VAR with 4 lags according to the AIC criterion and identify by
imposing a Cholesky scheme with the interest rates ordered first as explained in Section
3.4. Again, we perform the orthogonality test. As shown in Table 2, orthogonality cannot
be rejected, even at the 10% level, for all regressions. Hence we use the four-variable
VAR as our baseline specification.
Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions of dividends and stock prices to
signal, surprise and interest rate shocks. The dark gray and the light gray areas show the
68% and the 90% confidence bands, respectively, obtained by performing 2000 bootstrap
replications using Kilian, 1998, method. A positive signal, anticipating future dividend
growth, has large and significant contemporaneous effects on stock prices. On the other
hand, the stock market reacts more cautiously and gradually to a positive surprise shock,
which has large contemporaneous and permanent effects on dividends. Positive interest
rates shocks have little effects on dividends, but, as expected, have significant negative
impact on stock prices in the short run.
Let us now consider the structural representation. We begin the analysis by examin-
ing the series of the estimated shocks. First of all notice that the point estimate of σa/σs
is 0.44 (standard error 0.3), which entails a large noise, i.e. σe/σs = 0.90 (standard error
0.15). Figure 4 plots the two shocks. The vertical lines report events, most of them
exogenous, coinciding with peaks and troughs in the estimated series of the signal. All
of the events coincide with peaks or troughs of the noise shock. For instance the largest
21The truncation size is chosen on the basis of the estimated filter.
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negative noise shock is observed in 1987:Q4 and corresponds to the Black Monday (Oc-
tober 1987). Other negative shocks are registered in coincidence with the collapse of the
Franklin National Bank, the Gulf War I and the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers.
Positive noise shocks are found in coincidence of the Bush re-election and the 2009 fis-
cal stimulus. In coincidence of some of these events the dividend shock has the same
sign as the noise shock although is somehow smaller in terms of magnitudes. A notable
difference between the dividend shock and the noise shock is observed in 2004:Q4, in
coincidence with the Bush re-election, where the two shocks have opposite sign. Accord-
ing to our estimates, the Bush re-election is an episode with large negative effects on
economic fundamentals, accompanied by a large positive noise shock responsible for the
under-reaction of the stock market.
Figure 6 shows the impulse response functions of dividend and noise shocks on divi-
dends and stock prices. Positive dividend shocks are followed by an increase in dividends,
which reach their new long-run level after three quarters. Stock prices react immedi-
ately by a similar percentage amount and then remain approximately stable at the new
level. In line with the theory, the effect of the noise shock on dividends is small and
not significant at all horizons, even considering the tighter confidence region. By con-
trast, the effect of noise on the stock market, large and strongly significant on impact,
declines sharply after a few quarters and approaches zero in the long run, confirming the
temporary effect predicted by the model.
Table 3 reports the estimated decomposition of the forecast error variance at different
horizons. The signal explains about 20% of dividend variation at medium and long-run
horizons (two years or more), while the bulk of dividend volatility is captured by the
surprise shock. As for stock prices, the role of the signal and the surprise shocks are
inverted: the signal explains the bulk of stock price volatility, whereas the surprise shock
has a sizable effect only in the long run (about 20%). The surprise and the signal shocks
explain together about 90% of stock price variation on impact and about 70% at longer
horizons, the remaining 30% being explained by interest rates shocks. The dividend
shock explains about 20% of stock price variation on impact and almost one half at the
ten year horizon. Noise is very important, in that it explains the bulk of stock price
variance on impact (about 70%) and in the short-medium run (about 50% and 40% at
the 2-year and the 4-year horizons, respectively).
Figure 7 shows the impulse response functions of the two interest rates to dividend
and noise shocks. Both shocks induce a monetary policy tightening; the T-Bill increases
significantly for a few quarters according to the narrower bands. Interestingly enough,
after about two years the response of the T-Bill rate to the noise shock becomes negative
and significant at the 68% confidence level. Given that the noise shock has negligible real
effects, the dividends are largely unaffected, the result seems to support the idea that
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monetary policy, to some extent, responds to fluctuations in stock prices. Nonetheless
the response turns out to be relatively small. In fact the T-Bill increases up to 0.2% in
front of an increase of about 6% of stock prices. Moreover only a small fraction of the
interest rate, about 5%, is explained by noise.
4.3 Measuring historical boom-bust episodes
We have seen that stock prices, expressed in logs, are equal to the sum of the transitory
noise component —the “noise bubble”— plus a long-run structural component, which
can be interpreted as the intrinsic value. Hence the noise component has a noticeable
interpretation: it measures the percentage deviation of current prices from the “true”
value of equities. A positive (negative) value means that prices are overvaluated (under-
valuated) with respect to the intrinsic value by a certain percentage. Such a measure is
obtained by filtering the estimated noise shock with the corresponding impulse response
function.22
Figure 6 shows the bubble component (solid line), estimated with the four-variable
and the five-variable VAR, respectively. For the sake of comparison, the figures also
report the stock price series (dashed line) and the structural component, i.e. the intrinsic
value (dotted line). The estimates show several episodes of prolonged and sustained
deviations from the fundamental price. Here we limit our attention only to those episodes
in which deviations are 20% or higher.23 We find eight of such episodes: four positive
and four negative bubbles. The positive bubbles episodes are:
1. First half of the 70s (span: 1972:Q3-1973:Q1, max: 22.1% in 1972:Q3)
2. Second half of the 80s (span: 1987:Q3; max: 22.5% in 1987:Q3)
3. Dot-com (span: 1997:Q3-2002:Q1; max: 56.4% in 2000:Q2)
4. Mid 2000 (span: 2005:Q1; max: 21.1% in 2005:Q1)
The negative bubbles are
5. 1974 stock market crash (span: 1974:Q4; min: -23.7% in 1974:Q4)
6. Second half of the 70s (span: 1977:Q4-1979.Q4; min: -29.8% in 1978:Q1)
7. First half of the 80s (span: 1982:Q3-1983.Q2; min: -27.1% in 1983:Q1)
22Formally, the bubble is b̂t = aˆ(L)eˆt, where aˆ(L) = aˆ0 + aˆ1L + aˆ2L
2 + ... is the estimated impulse
response function of the log of stock prices to the noise shock and eˆt is the estimated noise shock.
23Adalid and Detken (2006) identify boom-bust episodes for a number of industrial countries. For the
US they find two episodes, the 1986-87 and the dot-com bubble, which appear also in our list.
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8. Great Recession (span: 2008:Q1-2009:Q4; min: -41.7% in 2009:Q1)
The dot-com bubble represents, by far, the episode with the largest and longest-
lasting deviations. Between 1997 and 2002 prices have been over-evaluated on average
by 40% with a peak of 56% in 2000:Q2. From the figures it emerges clearly that the
bulk of fluctuations in prices around these years is attributable to news having no effect
on future fundamentals, which were largely interpreted as genuine good news.
Notice that while our estimates point to a relatively large noise component in 2005,
they show that the peak in 2007:Q2 was not a bubble. On the contrary, stock prices
were undervaluated by about 10% compared to their fundamental value in that quarter.
Finally, the noise component accounts, to a large extent, for the large drop in prices in
2008.
We conclude this section with a historical digression on the conduct of monetary
policy in response to the noise bubble. Figure 7 plots the 3M T-Bill rate (dashed line),
the noise component (solid line) and the difference between the variable and the noise
component (dotted line). Figure 8 plots the noise components of the 3M T-Bill rate and
the stock prices together. In general, fluctuations in the interest rate driven by noise
have become more volatile since late 90s. More specifically, at the onset of the dot-com
bubble monetary policy responded to the increase in prices by increasing the interest
rate by about 1%. However, around 1997, while prices kept rapidly growing, the interest
rate stalled. The stock prices bust is followed by a huge drop in the interest rate, by
around 3%. Actually during the second half of the 2000, absent the bubble, the interest
rate would have been much higher, around 4%, than the observed value of 1.5%. Given
that the real effects of the noise shock are relatively limited, the huge fall of the interest
rate supports the idea that monetary policy has reacted quite strongly to the burst of
the bubble and that the low levels of the interest rate observed until 2005 were driven
by factors disconnected from economic fundamentals.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied an environment in which rational traders receive noisy
signals about future economic fundamentals. We have shown that the resulting stock
price equilibrium includes a transitory component which can be responsible for boom and
bust episodes unrelated to fluctuations of economic fundamentals —the “noise bubbles”.
Noise bubbles are a component of what is usually referred to as the “fundamental” value
of securities, i.e. the present value of expected dividends, so that they have nothing to
do with multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling expectations.
We have shown that, in our theoretical framework, the structural shocks —“dividend”
and “noise” shocks— can be estimated by using a non-standard structural VAR proce-
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dure, where identification is obtained by imposing a “dynamic” rotation of the VAR
residuals, involving their future values.
In the empirical section we have applied our procedure to US data. We have found
that, consistently with the theory, the noise shock has transitory effects on stock prices,
whereas the dividend shock has permanent effects. Moreover, noise is very important, in
that it explains the bulk of stock price fluctuations at short and medium-run horizons.
Finally, the historical decomposition shows that the component of stock prices driven by
the noise shock is responsible for the information technology bubble; the boom peaking
in 2007 was entirely driven by genuine news, whereas the following stock market crisis
is largely accountable to a negative noise bubble.
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Appendix
The log-linear present value model
To obtain formula (1), let us start from the accounting identity
Pt =
1
1 + rt+1
(Pt+1 +Dt+1),
where Pt is the price of equities, Dt is dividends and rt is the rate of return on equities.
Setting rt = r and taking logs we get
pt = − log(1+r)+log
(
ept+1 + edt+1
)
= − log(1+r)+pt+1 +log
(
1 + edt+1−pt+1
)
, (28)
where pt = logPt and dt = logDt. Now let us set wt = dt−pt and linearize log (1 + ewt+1)
with respect to wt+1 around µ = Ewt. We obtain
log (1 + ewt+1) ≈ log (1 + eµ)+ e
µ
1 + eµ
(wt+1−µ) = − log ρ−µ(1−ρ)+(1−ρ)(dt+1−pt+1),
where ρ = (1 + eµ)−1. Replacing in (28) we get the approximate accounting identity
pt = k + ρpt+1 + (1− ρ)dt+1, (29)
where k = − log(1 + r) − log ρ − µ(1 − ρ) = − log(1 + r) − log ρ + (1 − ρ) log(1/ρ − 1).
Equation (1) is obtained by solving forward, taking expectations at time t on both sides
and imposing a transversality condition.
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Shock Lags Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Surprise 2 0.66 0.82 0.98 0.92 0.66 0.93
4 0.07 0.09 0.42 0.64 0.41 0.88
Signal 2 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.81 0.05
4 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.91 0.05
Dividend 2 0.21 0.39 0.73 0.86 0.51 0.21
4 0.39 0.48 0.78 0.97 0.62 0.41
Noise 2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.63 0.03
4 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.86 0.05
Table 1: Results of the fundamentalness test in the bivariate VAR. The table reports
the p-values of the F -test in the regressions of the estimated shocks on 2 and 4 lags of
the regressors (1)-(6). Dividend and noise shocks are truncated at time T − 4 since end-
of-sample estimates are inaccurate. Regressors: (1) 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary
Market Rate; (2) 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate; (3) Moody’s Seasoned Aaa
Corporate Bond Yield; (4) GDP Implicit Price Deflator; (5) The Conference Board Lead-
ing Economic Indicators Index; (6) Michigan University Consumer Confidence Expected
Index.
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Shock Lags Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Surprise 2 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.79 0.82 0.60
4 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.84 0.98 0.70
Signal 2 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.43 0.95 0.53
4 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.59 0.98 0.27
Dividend 2 0.91 0.90 0.98 0.80 0.89 0.22
4 0.96 0.72 0.97 0.91 0.98 0.51
Noise 2 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.31 0.73 0.20
4 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.58 0.93 0.14
Table 2: Results of the fundamentalness test in the 4-variable VAR. The table reports
the p-values of the F -test in the regressions of the estimated shocks on 2 and 4 lags of
the regressors (1)-(6). Dividend and noise shocks are truncated at time T − 4 since end-
of-sample estimates are inaccurate. Regressors: (1) 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary
Market Rate; (2) 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate; (3) Moody’s Seasoned Aaa
Corporate Bond Yield; (4) GDP Implicit Price Deflator; (5) The Conference Board Lead-
ing Economic Indicators Index; (6) Michigan University Consumer Confidence Expected
Index.
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Variable Horizon
Impact 1-Year 2-Year 4-Years 10-Years
Surprise
3-M T. Bill Rate 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (1.5) 0.5 (2.7) 0.6 (3.6) 1.2 (5.1)
AAA C. Bond Yield 0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (1.3) 0.1 (2.0) 0.5 (3.7) 0.8 (5.9)
Dividends 99.7 (10.7) 81.7 (9.0) 75.2 (11.4) 73.8 (12.5) 74.0 (15.9)
Stock Prices 2.5 (2.1) 1.3 (2.7) 1.9 (4.7) 4.6 (8.9) 18.4 (14.6)
Signal
3-M T. Bill Rate 0.0 (0.0) 5.4 (4.2) 7.3 (6.1) 8.0 (6.4) 17.0 (8.8)
AAA C. Bond Yield 0.0 (0.0) 3.0 (3.4) 3.8 (4.9) 2.7 (5.6) 11.1 (9.2)
Dividends 0.0 (0.0) 14.7 (7.0) 20.7 (10.1) 17.3 (11.6) 17.8 (15.4)
Stock Prices 87.5 (5.0) 72.1 (9.5) 67.7 (11.5) 63.1 (13.7) 56.8 (15.8)
Dividend shock
3-M T. Bill Rate 0.0 (0.0) 1.4 (2.8) 2.8 (4.6) 2.6 (4.8) 5.9 (8.1)
AAA C. Bond Yield 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (1.7) 0.4 (2.7) 0.7 (3.6) 1.7 (7.5)
Dividends 0.0 (0.0) 94.2 (11.5) 94.4 (10.8) 90.0 (13.4) 91.3 (13.7)
Stock Prices 17.3 (21.3) 21.4 (18.8) 21.5 (18.1) 26.1 (18.3) 45.0 (19.7)
Noise
3-M T. Bill Rate 0.0 (0.0) 4.2 (3.6) 4.9 (4.8) 6.0 (6.2) 12.2 (8.0)
AAA C. Bond Yield 0.0 (0.0) 2.8 (2.9) 3.6 (4.3) 2.5 (5.3) 10.2 (8.8)
Dividends 0.0 (0.0) 1.3 (9.6) 1.1 (7.7) 0.8 (6.3) 0.4 (4.3)
Stock Prices 72.4 (21.5) 52.0 (19.1) 47.9 (18.1) 41.4 (16.7) 30.0 (14.1)
Table 3: Variance decomposition in the 4-variable VAR. The entries are the percentages
of forecast error variance explained by the shocks at the specified horizons. Standard
errors in brackets.
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30
Figure 2: S&P 500 (dotted line) and Net Corporate Dividends (solid line) both in logs.
On the x-axis there are the quarters. The events occurs in quarter 1.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions of dividends and stock prices to surprise and signal
shocks in the 4-variable VAR. Solid line: point estimates. Dark gray area: 68% confidence
bands. Light gray area: 90% confidence bands.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions of dividends and stock prices to the 3-month Trea-
sury bill, secondary market interest rate shock and the AAA corporate bond yield shock
in the 4-variable VAR. Solid line: point estimates. Dark gray area: 68% confidence
bands. Light gray area: 90% confidence bands.
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions of dividends and stock prices to dividend and
noise shocks in the 4-variable VAR. Solid line: point estimates. Dark gray area: 68%
confidence bands. Light gray area: 90% confidence bands.
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions of 3M T-Bill and AAA Bond yield to dividend and
noise shocks in the 4-variable VAR. Solid line: point estimates. Dark gray area: 68%
confidence bands. Light gray area: 90% confidence bands.
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Figure 8: Historical decomposition in the 4-variable VAR. Dashed line: log of the S&P
500 stock price index divided by the GDP deflator. Solid line: noise component of the
stock price index. Dotted line: difference between the stock price index and the noise
component. The decomposition is truncated at time T −4 since end-of-sample estimates
are inaccurate.
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Figure 9: Historical decomposition in the 4-variable VAR. Dashed line: 3M T-Bill. Solid
line: noise component of the 3M T-Bill. Dotted line: difference between the 3M T-Bill
and the noise component. The decomposition is truncated at time T − 4 since end-of-
sample estimates are inaccurate.
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Figure 10: Historical decomposition in the 4-variable VAR. Solid line: noise component
of the 3M T-Bill (left axis). Dashed line: noise component of the log of the (real) S&P
500 stock price index (right axis). The decomposition is truncated at time T − 4 since
end-of-sample estimates are inaccurate.
39
